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Abstract: In this paper we introduce and investigate some evolutionary games arising from the 
γ and the δ static models of coalition formation defined in Hart and Kurz (1983). In particular, we 
assume that players determine at every instant their strategies and we study how the coalition 
structure might evolve accordingly. Finally, we focus on minimal change revisions of coalition 
structure probabilistic beliefs and provide existence results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability of coalition structures has been analyzed via concepts of 
equilibrium in associated strategic form games. The key feature for this approach is that the strategy 
set of each player i is the set of all subgroups of players containing i and his choice represents the 
coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile (i.e. a coalition for each player), the 
coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined. So, different rules of coalition structure 
formation can be considered, namely, functions associating to every strategy profile a coalition 
structure. In Hart and Kurz (1983)  the following rules are proposed: the model γ  and the model δ . 
In this paper we look at the evolutionary games arising from the γ  and the δ  models in which 
players determine at every instant their strategies and, in particular, we study how the coalition 
structure evolve according to the strategic choices. For this purpose we consider mixed strategies 
and, firstly, we notice that natural generalizations of the γ  and the δ  models to this case lead to 
multiplicity of  beliefs (on the set of coalition structures) coherent with the probability assignments 
given by the strategy profile. Coherency is regarded as a viability constraint for the differential 
inclusions describing the evolutionary games. Therefore, we investigate viability properties of the 
constraints and characterize velocities of pairs belief/strategies which guarantee that coherency of 
beliefs is always satisfied. Finally, among many coherent belief revisions (evolutions), we 
investigate those characterized by minimal change and provide existence results. 
 
2. The stage game 
 
Let {1, , }I n= …  be the set of players. Then the coalition structures set  (CS set, for short) is the set 
ℑ  of all partitions of I. In Hart and Kurz (1983), the strategy set of each agent i is 
{ | }i S I i SΣ = ⊆ ∈ , so that a strategy profile is the n-tuple 1( , , )n ii IS S ∈… ∈ Σ∏  and the strategy iS   
is the set of players that player i wishes to join. The γ  and the δ  rules of coalition formation 
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specify which coalition structures form for every strategy profile. Such rules are given by the 
functions : i
i I
hγ
∈
Σ → ℑ∏ ;  : i
i I
hδ
∈
Σ → ℑ∏   defined respectively by 
1)    1( , , ) for all or { }for somen jT h S S T S j T T l l I
γ∈ … = ∈ = ∈–  
2)     1( , , ) for all , or { }for somen i jT h S S S S i j T T l l I
δ∈ … = ∈ = ∈–  
 
2.1 Mixed Strategies 
 
Differently from Hart and Kurz (1983), we assume that every player is allowed to choose a mixed 
strategy, called  mixed coalition, i.e. a vector of probabilities ,( )i i S S im m=   such that , 0i Sm ≥  for all 
S i  and , 1i S
S i
m =∑

. 
We notice that, given a mixed strategy profile, the probability of each coalition is not unequivocally 
determined so we propose two  rules of mixed coalition formation which provide a probability 
assignment on coalitions ( )S S Iμ ⊆  and generalize the γ  and the δ  rules: 
,
{ }
, | | 2
for | | 2
:
1 for every
S i S
i S
i S
S i S
m S
i I
μ
γ
μ μ
∈
≥
⎧ = ≥⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ = − ∈⎪⎩
∏
∑

              ;         
,
{ }
, | | 2
max for | | 2
:
1 for every
S T S i T
i S
i S
S i S
m S
i I
μ
δ
μ μ
⊇
∈
≥
⎧ ⎡ ⎤= ≥⎪ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ = − ∈⎪⎪⎩
∏
∑

 
 
We refer to the previous rules as the mixed γ  and the mixed δ  rules. We notice that these rules 
satisfy:  1 for allS
S i
i Iμ = ∈∑

. This means that the restriction of the probability assignment to the 
strategy set of each player is a probability distribution which, however, might be different from the 
his mixed strategy.  
 
2.1 Coherent Coalition Structures Beliefs 
 
Since players give probabilities to the coalitions they wish to join, then  the outcome of their play is 
uncertain. To describe this uncertainty,  we call coalition structure belief (CS belief for short) a 
probability distribution ( ) ∈ℑ= B B   on ℑ .  A coalition S  can be interpreted as an event in the set of 
all coalition structures ℑ , more precisely { | }S Sℑ= ∈ ∈B B  for every S I⊆ , so that the 
probability Sμ can be regarded as { | }S prob Sμ ℑ= ∈ ∈B B  for every S I⊆ . 
We require that a CS belief should be coherent in the sense of de Finetti (1931) with the probability 
assignments on the event/coalition S  for every S I⊆ . This is equivalent to say that, for every  
event/coalition S ,  the total probability theorem should be satisfied, that is, a CS belief must 
satisfy the following coherency constraints: 
(CC) :=     S
S
S Iμ= ∀ ⊆∑ B
B


.                                                      
We recall that  the total number of partitions of a set with n elements  is given by the Bell number, 
denoted with B(n), and defined by the following recursive equation 
1
0
1
( ) ( )
n
k
n
B n B k
k
−
=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
−=∑ . 
Moreover,  the number of non empty coalitions  of a set with n elements  is 
1
( ) 2 1
n
n
k
n
C n
k=
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠= = −∑ . 
MTISD 2008 – Methods, Models and Information Technologies for Decision Support Systems 
Università del Salento, Lecce, 18­20 September 2008   
 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
© 2008 University of Salento - SIBA http://siba2.unile.it/ese                                                                                                              177
Therefore, coherency constraints (CC) define a linear system with ( )C n  equations in the ( )B n  
unknowns ( ) ∈ℑ= B B  . We prove that: 
i. Whenever there are more than 5 players ( )B n  is larger than ( )C n . 
ii. Whenever there are more than 5 players, coherency constraints (CC) might have more than 
one solution. 
iii. Whenever the probability assignment ( )S S Iμ ⊆  is given by the the mixed γ  or the mixed δ  
rules, then the system (CC) admits a least a solution. 
 
3. Dynamics 
 
We analyze the evolutionary games arising from the mixed γ  and the mixed δ  models. We 
consider the situation in which players determine at every instant the set of players they wish to 
join, more precisely   players act on the velocities of the strategies which are regarded as controls, 
and then, we study how the coalition structure belief might evolve, governed by Nature, according 
to these strategic choices, that is, coherently with the probability assignments on coalitions 
determined by the strategies.  So we look at the solutions of the following control system subject to 
state constraints ( K ): 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
( ) ( ( ), ( ))
( ) ( ( )), ( ))
i i
i i
t h t
m t u t i I
u t U m t t i I
h H m t t
′
′
∈ℑ
⎧ = ∀ ∈ℑ⎪ = ∀ ∈⎪⎨ ∈ ∀ ∈⎪⎪ ∈⎩
B B
B B
 B


  ;        ( K ):= ,
,
) 0
) 1 0
) 0 with ,
) 1 0
) ( , ) 0
i S
i S
S i
S S
S
i
ii
iii m S I S i i I
iv m i I
v m S Iχ μ
∈ℑ
≥ ∀ ∈ℑ⎧⎪ − =⎪⎪⎪ ≥ ∀ ⊆ ∀ ∈⎨⎪ − = ∀ ∈⎪⎪ = − = ∀ ⊆⎪⎩
∑
∑
∑
B
B
B
B
B
 B

 


  
 
Of course, there is no a-priori reason why a solution of the system should be viable in the 
constraints K  for every [0, [t∈ +∞ , that is, satisfy the constraints for every [0, [t∈ +∞ . Moreover, 
the constraints set K  is said to be viable under the control system if for every point in K  there 
exists at least one solution starting from this point which remains in K  for every [0, [t∈ +∞ . So we 
are interested to characterize velocities such that the corresponding solutions and the set K  are 
viable. To this purpose we apply the main viability theorems for control systems as stated in Aubin 
(1991, 1997).  
Main result 
Recall that a direction v  belongs to the contingent cone ( )KT y  of the set K  in a point y K∈ if there 
exist sequences 0nε >  converging to 0 and nv  converging to  v  such that n ny v K nε+ ∈ ∀ ∈` . 
Denote 
1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )[ ]
n
i
i
m H m U m
=
= × ∏M     then we define the regulation map as 
{ }( , ) ( , ) ( , ) | ( , ) ( , )K KR m h u m h u T m= ∈ ∈ M   .  
So we can prove that under suitable assumption, the set K  is viable if and only if the images of the 
regulation map  are not empty. Moreover every viable evolution of pairs CS belief/mixed strategies 
is governed by the following system: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ),
( ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )).
i i
K
t h t
m t u t i I
u t h t R t m t
′
′
⎧ = ∀ ∈ℑ⎪ = ∀ ∈⎨⎪ ∈⎩
B B B

 
where the regulation map, in the the mixed γ  model, has to satisfy the following   
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, ,
,
, ,
{ }
, ,
{ } { }{ }
) 0 whenever 0
) 0
) 0 whenever 0
) 0,
) 0, ,| | 2
) 0, .
i S i S
i S
S i
i S j S
S i S j S i
i S j S
S k i S kj S i
i h
ii h
iii u m
iv u i I
v h u m S I S
vi u m h k I
∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
ℑ
≥ =⎧⎪ =⎪⎪ ≥ =⎪⎪ = ∀ ∈⎪⎨⎪ ⎛ ⎞− = ∀ ⊆ ≥⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ + = ∀ ∈⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩
∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∏
∑ ∑ ∑∏
B B
B
B
B
B 5
B
B5



| 
    
while, in the mixed δ model, has to satisfy: 
, ,
,
, ,
{ }
, ,
{ } { }{ }
) 0 whenever 0
) 0
) 0 whenever 0
) 0,
) 0, ,| | 2
) 0, .
i S i S
i S
S i
i S j S
S i S j S i
i S j S
S k i S kj S i
i h
ii h
iii u m
iv u i I
v h u m S I S
vi u m h k I
∈
∈ ∈
∈ ∈
ℑ
≥ =⎧⎪ =⎪⎪ ≥ =⎪⎪ = ∀ ∈⎪⎨⎪ ⎛ ⎞− = ∀ ⊆ ≥⎪ ⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎪ + = ∀ ∈⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦⎩
∑
∑
∑ ∑ ∏
∑ ∑ ∑∏
B B
B
B
B
B 5
B
B5



| 
 
 
Belief Revision 
Finally, given feedback (state dependent) controls of the players, the evolution of the beliefs can be 
regarded as a problem of probabilistic belief revision. Namely, the classical  question in belief 
revision theory is the following: Suppose one holds a certain belief about the states of the  world 
and at a given moment something that contradicts these belief is observed. How should the belief be 
revised? We  focus on the idea of minimal change revision (see  Perea (2007)). if one observes an 
event that contradicts the previous belief, then the new belief about the world  should explain the 
event just observed, and should be ``as close as possible'' to the previous ones, i.e. previous belief 
should change, but not more than necessary. In our case, belief revision works in continuous time 
and  revised belief explain observations at every instant through the coherency conditions, since 
observations are in terms of probability assignments on coalitions rather than events; moreover,  the 
idea of minimal change is translated in terms of revision with minimal velocity and we provide 
existence theorems for evolutions of CS belief of minimal velocity.  
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